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LABOR LAW: EMPLOYEES' SOLICITATION- DISTRIBUTION
RIGHTS SUPERSEDE CONTRACT WAIVER
NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 94 S. Ct. 1099 (1974)
Pursuant to contractual authorization, respondent, Magnavox Company of
Tennessee, issued a rule prohibiting employee distribution of literature on2
company property at any time., When Magnavox refused to rescind the rule,
the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers charged
the company with violation of section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).3 The National Labor Relations Board held 4 that the right of
all employees to distribute literature during nonworking time and in nonworking areas of company premises, for or against any union, was a fundamental
section 7 right 5 that could not be waived by contract.6 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals denied enforcement of the Board's order. On certiorari,8 the
United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, employees' section 7 rights
to distribute literature or solicit during nonworking time may not be contractually waived by collective bargaining representatives. 9

1. Since 1954 Magnavox and the union had negotiated six three-year contracts, each of
which contained a provision authorizing Magnavox to issue such rules. Brief for Petitioner
at 2-4, NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 94 S. Ct. 1099 (1974).
2. In 1970 the union requested that Magnavox lift the ban on literature distribution.
Magnavox refused. Brief for Petitioner at 4, NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 94 S. Ct. 1099 (1974).
3. 29 U.S.C. §168(a)(1) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157."
4. Magnavox Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 265 (1972). The Board affirmed with modification the
findings of the administrative law judge that (1) the rule was presumptively invalid under
principles of law established by the Supreme Court and the Board; (2) based on the past
practice of the parties, the contract should be construed to include a negotiated waiver of
objections to the rule; but (3) the fundamental rights of dissident employees to distribute
literature on nonworking premises and nonworking time, against the incumbent, or for a
rival union, may not be relinquished by such a waiver.
5. 29 U.S.C. §157 (1970) provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158(a)(3)."
6. 195 N.L.R.B. 265 (1972). The Board's order modified the administrative law judge's
findings by proscribing any contractual waiver of all employees' distribution rights, whether
for or against the incumbent or any union.
7. Magnavox Co. v. NLRB, 474 F.2d 1269 (6th Cir. 1973). The court conceded that an
inferred contractual waiver of such important employee rights was dubious, but reversed
the Board's order in accordance with its prior decisions.
8. 94 S. Ct. 53 (1973). The Court granted certiorari because of the conflict among the
circuit courts as well as between some circuits and the Board.
9. 94 S. Ct. 1099 (1974) (Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
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Basic principles regarding employer's unilaterally imposed no-solicitation

and no-distribution rules were established early in the history of the NLRA.O
Any rule prohibiting employees from distributing literature or soliciting on
nonworking time is presumed invalid.- On the other hand, a rule banning
employee solicitation or distribution of literature during working time is presumptively valid.1 2 Additionally, an employer may generally prohibit solicitaor literature distribution by nonemployees anywhere on company property, at

any time.

s

10. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Peyton Packing Co., 49
N.L.R.B. 828 (1943). In Republic Aviation the Supreme Court adopted the Board's principles
concerning unilaterally imposed rules against employee distribution of literature and solicitation, which were first announced in Peyton Packing: "Mhe Board... sufficiently expressed
the theory upon which it concludes that rules against solicitation ... must fall as interferences with union organization. . . . We perceive no error in the Board's adoption of this
presumption." Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945). See also NLRB
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). The Board subsequently made its most definitive statement of those principles in Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697, 697-99 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961), as amplified in Stoddard Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B.
615 (1962).
11. Both the Board and the courts regard this principle as a presumption. E.g., NLRB
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324
U.S. 793, 803 (1945); NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co., 374 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1967); Walton
Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697, 697-99 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 177, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1961);
Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943). The presumption is rebuttable by special,
justifying circumstances such as the need to maintain production or discipline. Babcock &
Wilcox; Republic Aviation, NLRB v. Linda Joe Shoe Co., 307 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1962);
William H. Block Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 341 (1964); Peyton Packing Co. The burden of demonstrating such circumstances is on the employer. When there is such demonstration the
Board and the courts will balance the property and business interests of the employer with
the statutory organizational rights of the employees. See text accompanying note 18 infra.
12. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Walton Mfg. Co., 126
N.L.R.B. 697 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B.
828 (1943). This presumption is rebuttable by inculpating circumstances such as discriminatory enforcement of the rule. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958);
United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Challenge-Cook Bros.,
374 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1967); William H. Block Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 341 (1964); W.T. Grant
Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 152 (1962); Star-Brite Indus., Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1960). The burden
of demonstrating such circumstances is officially on the Board's general counsel; but, of
course, the employee or the union must supply sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges.
13. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956). "The Board failed to make
distinction between rules of law applicable to employees and those applicable to nonemThe distinction is one of substance. No restriction may be placed on the employces ....
ployees' right to discuss self-organization among themselves, unless the employer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain production or discipline. But no such
obligation is owed nonemployee organizers."
This, too, is a rebuttable presumption, but the burden of producing rebuttal evidence,
although officially on the Board's general counsel, rests with the nonemployee organizers to
demonstrate mitigating circumstances. Such mitigating circumstances are: (1) discriminatory
enforcement of the rule, Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Solo Cup Co., 172 N.L.R.B.
1110 (1968), rev'd, 422 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1970). See generally Note, No-Solicitation and NoDistributionRules: Presumptive Validity and Discrimination,112 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1049 (1964);
(2) genuine hardship, including lack of reasonable, alternative means of communication,
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. SH, Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d
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A further distinction is drawn between rules against employee solicitation
and rules against employee literature distribution.1 ' A rule barring solicitation
by employees in working areas, during nonwork time, is generally held invalid. 15 A rule banning literature distribution by employees in working areas,
during working or nonworking time, is presumed valid.'6 Additionally, a rule
so broad or ambiguous that it might include the invalid rules is presumed invalid.17
In formulating these basic presumptions concerning the validity of solicitation and distribution rules, the Board and the courts have balanced the property and business interests of employers with the statutory rights of employees
and their organized bargaining representatives.'3 Similarly, when special cir-

Cir. 1967); Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Lake
Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948); see Gould, The Question of Union
Activity on Company Property, 16 VAND. L. REv. 73, 97-104 (1964);
(3) unsafe conditions, Solo Cup Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1968), rev'd, 422 F.2d 1149 (7th
Cir. 1970); Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1953);
(4) unjustifiable, quasi-state infringements of constitutionally protected rights, Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 398 U.S. 308 (1966). But see Central Hardware
Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972); Peterson v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.
1973). See also 67 MICH. L. REv. 573 (1969).
14. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 643 (1962); Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138
N.L.R.B. 615 (1962). The Board's distinction is based on an analysis of the different purposes
and results of the two different media of communication used by employees exercising their
§7 rights. Oral solicitation is an interpersonal exchange of conversation among employees,
affecting an employer's interests only if it occurs during worktime. Because of litter, distribution of literature may affect an employer's interests in cleanliness, order, efficiency, and
even production. Circulation of union authorization cards, however, is considered solicitation,
not distribution, and may be restricted only during worktime. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138
N.L.R.B. 615, 620 n.6 (1962).
The Board has consistently applied this analysis in its subsequent decisions. See, e.g.,
Farah Mfg. Co., 187 N.L.R.B. 601 (1970); S.N.C. Mfg. Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 159 (1969); Remington Rand Corp., 141 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1963). Although the circuit courts have enforced these
decisions, very few have intimated that they have adopted the distinguishing principles of
the Board's analysis. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ertel Mfg. Corp., 352 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1965). Most
courts have continued to use the older principles enunciated by the Supreme Court and the
Board. The rule regarding nonemployees remains unchanged: In the absence of mitigating
circumstances, an employer may ban solicitation or literature distribution by nonemployees
on company property. See Vanderheyden, Employee Solicitation and Distribution- A Second
Look, 14 LAB. L.J. 781 (1963).
15. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962). This presumption is rebuttable
by demonstration of special circumstances. See cases cited note 10 supra. Continuing sales in
retail department stores are such a special circumstance; solicitation by employees, during
nonwork time, may be banned from the work areas and restricted to nonselling areas. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1965); Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co., 123
N.L.R.B. 747 (1959), modified, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952); May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B.
976 (1944), modified & enforced, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946).
16. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962); see cases cited note 11 supra.
17. E.g., NLRB v. Miller, 341 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 277 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1960); Campbell Soup Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 74 (1966), enforced, 389
F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1967); Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 177
(5th Cir. 1961).
18. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 110-12 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp.
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cumstances are presented to rebut the presumption of validity in an individual
case, the interests of the party producing the rebuttal evidence are weighed
against the interests of the party for whom the presumption operates.1 9
A balancing approach is also used when a rule that would otherwise be
presumed void is authorized by a contract between the employer and the employees' organized representative. In this context, the conflicting considerations
to be balanced are the freedom of the employer and the union to contract
through collective bargaining and the freedom of individual employees to exercise organizational rights quaranteed under section 7 of the NLRA.20 In
early decisions contract-authorized abridgements of employee organizational
rights to solicit and to distribute literature were upheld on the theory that
such rights lose their statutory protection when waived by the bargaining rep21
resentatives.
Gale Products,Division of Outboard Marine Corp.22 marked a significant
departure from the early decisions concerning contractual waiver of section 7
rights. On the basis of an explicit provision in the collective bargaining contract between the employer, Gale Products, and the incumbent union, employees were forbidden to solicit or distribute literature on behalf of a rival
union. The Board ruled that a contractual provision is invalid if it prohibits
employee solicitation or distribution during nonwork hours, in nonwork areas,
when the solicitation or distribution is opposed to the incumbent union, or in
favor of a rival. Such a contract, the Board reasoned, interferes with the free
exercise of section 7 rights. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce the Board's order.23
The next year, in Armco Steel Corp.,24 a rival union filed charges against
the employer under circumstances similar to those in Gale Products. The
Board followed the reasoning of its Gale Products decision and held the conv. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945); NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.
1963); G.M.C. 158 N.L.R.B. 1723, 1727 (1968).
19. NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co., 374 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963); Gale Prods. Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 142
N.L.R.B. 1246, 1249 (1963).
20. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953); International Union, UAW, 158 N.L.R.B. 1723 (1966). Both rights, while not unconditional, are
fundamental policies of the NLRA and the basic issue is the extent to which one right may
limit the other. Id. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 94 S. Ct. 1099, 1102 (1974).
21. Clinton Foods, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 239 (1955); Fruitvale Canning Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
884 (1950); North Am. Aviation, Inc., 56 N.L.R.B. 959 (1944); May Dep't Stores Co., 59
N.L.R.B. 976 (1944), enforced, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946).
22. 142 N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963).
23. NLRB v. Gale Prods., Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce the Board's order because: (1) the
contractually provided rule was a bilateral product of collective bargaining, which bargained
away employees' solicitation-distribution rights; (2) employees' solicitation-distribution rights
are a desirable convenience, not the fundamental §7 rights guaranteed by the NLRA; and
(3) the contractual arrangement promoted stable labor relations consistent with a primary
policy of the NLRA.
24. 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964).
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tractual rule invalid insofar as it prevented employee literature distribution
against the incumbent union, or for a rival. 25 On appeal the Sixth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's Armco order, thus concurring with the Seventh
Circuit's position in Gale Products.26 The court criticized the partitioning of
employees into two classes- dissidents and loyalists - as a means of determining whether a contractual ban is valid or invalid. Such partitioning was
considered adverse to an important NLRA objective - the promotion of industrial peace. Thereafter, the rival union filed for charges with the Board
against the incumbent union for interference with the employees' section 7
rights by agreeing to and acquiescing in a contract sanctioned restriction on
those rights. The Board dismissed the charges in conformity with the Sixth
Crcuit's Armco decision. 2 7 The rival union then appealed to the District of
Columbia Circuit, 28 which noted the Sixth Circuit's unanimous affirmance of
the contractual-waiver defense and refused to reverse the Board's deference to
29
the Sixth Circuit.
Despite the position of the Sixth, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits the Board continued to adhere to its reasoning in Gale Products and
Armco.3 0 For example, in Mid-States Metal Products, Inc.3 1 the Board held

25. While Armco was pending before the Board, and prior to the Seventh Circuit's refusal to enforce the Board's order in NLRB v. Gale Prods., Div. of Outboard Marine Corp.,
337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964), the director of the Board's ninth region filed a petition in
federal court for a temporary injunction against Armco Steel Corp. to halt enforcement by
the company of a contract ban of employee literature distribution on company property.
The challenger to the contractual no-distribution rule was a rival union. The district court,
in Getreau v. Armco Steel Corp., 241 F. Supp. 376, 379 (S.D. Ohio 1964), denied the petition
for injunction, maintaining that the Board's new position taken in Gale Products (which was
highly similar to the Armco case) was not correct law concerning §8(a)(1) violations, and that
the contractual no-distribution rule must legally bind all employees if the entire collective
bargaining process is to be preserved.
26. 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965). The court held that the Board's pre-Gale Products
principles were correct and that the contractual no-distribution provision was valid and
binding on all employees in the absence of explicit violations of a specific statutory provision, because the employees waived via their bargaining representative any §7 rights that
might conflict with the contract provision. The court also denied enforcement of the Board's
order in G.M.C., 147 N.L.R.B. 509 (1964), enforcement denied, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965).
Later, the District of Columbia Circuit denied enforcement when the Board decided the
G.M.C. case again, 158 N.L.R.B. 1723 (1966), enforcement denied, 881 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir.
1967). See also Chevrolet Motor Div., G.M.C., 144 N.L.R.B. 862 (1963).
27. 155 N.L.R.B. 551 (1965).
28. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 29 U.S.C. §160(f)
(1970) provides that an aggrieved person may obtain review of an order of the Board in the
federal circuit court where the unfair labor practice occurred or the aggrieved person resides, or in the District of Columbia Circuit Court.
29. The alleged unfair labor practices in this case occurred in the jurisdiction of the
Sixth Circuit.
30. In H. & F. Binch Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 929, 935 (1967), the Board invalidated a contractual ban on employee solicitation and literature distribution insofar as it restrained exercise of employee organizational rights against the incumbent union, or on behalf of a rival.
31. 156 N.L.R.B. 812 (1966). The events occurred in Mississippi, a right-to-work state,
where the lack of union security enabled rival organizational activity to occur constantly.
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that a contractually authorized rule was overbroad and invalid insofar as it

prevented employee solicitation during nonwork time and employee distribution of literature in nonwork areas during nonwork time, on behalf of any
labor union other than the contracting one. On appeal3 2 the Fifth Circuit
agreed with the Board and held that the solicitation-distribution right is a

fundamental organizational right necessary to the free selection of bargaining
representatives, not merely a desirable convenience. The court reasoned that,
unlike collective economic rights, the solicitation-distribution right is guaran-

teed by section 7 to individual employees. Consequently, it may not be bargained away because a waiver benefits the union but is detrimental to the employees. The Fifth Circuit thus became the first one to support the Board's
rationale in Gale Products and Armco. The Eight Circuit soon followed suit.
In InternationalAssociation of Machinists33 the court enforced a Board order
holding a contractual no-distribution rule invalid, but modified the order to

include all employees, not just those opposing the incumbent union34
As the conflict among the circuit courts demonstrates, this area in the law
32. NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Prods., Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 403 F.2d 702 (5th
Cir. 1968).

33. 171 N.L.R.B. 234, 236 (1968). The Board held that enforcement of the contractual
no-distribution rule was a per se violation of the NLRA without any evidence that the rule
had been enforced against employees seeking to oppose the incumbent union. Although the
Board rendered its decision before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the Board's
order in Mid-States, it refused to revert to pre-Gale Products principles. "It is true that every

circuit court of appeals which has had occasion to review a Board decision involving this
issue has refused to enforce the Board's order. However, in spite of such reversals, the Board
is still adhering to its position that 'such contract provisions interfere with employees in
exercising their basic rights under the Act.' Trial Examiners have been admonished to adhere to Board precedents ...until the Board itself has definitively acquiesced in the contrary decisions of the circuit courts of appeal, or until the issue has been finally decided by
the United States Supreme Court." Id. In Magnavox the Supreme Court did just that.
34. International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 113, 115-16 (8th Cir. 1969). The
court held: (1) that employees' personal, organizational rights to distribute literature may
not be contractually waived by a union; (2) that such a contract provision exceeds and contravenes NLRA policies; and (3) that the contractual provision may not prohibit employee
distribution of literature for or against any union, including the incumbent (thus modifying
the Board's order).
The court refrained from deciding whether a contractual no-distribution rule is valid if
it is expressly limited to that period of the contract's effective duration when an incumbent
union is secure from efforts to oust it. This possibility was not at issue in NLRB v. MidStates Metal Prods., Inc., 403 F.2d 702 (1968), because Mississippi is a right-to-work jurisdiction and a union is always vulnerable during the life of the contract. See note 30 supra. The
instant case appears to have answered the question negatively by invalidating contractual
waivers of the §7 right to solicit or distribute literature.
In United Aircraft Corp., 179 N.L.R.B. 935 (1969) and United Aircraft Corp., 180
N.L.R.B. 278 (1969), the Board upheld an overbroad contractual rule because on the basis
of past practice of the parties an industrial common law had interpretively narrowed the
scope of the term "working hours" to mean paid time including rest breaks, but not lunch
hours. The 'Second Circuit- Court of Appeals- concurred with the Board in United Aircraft
Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1971). But see United Aircraft Corp., 188 N.L.R.B. 633
(1971), where the Board adopted the recommendations-of the administrative law judge, who
criticized the Board's decision in the earlier United Aircraft cases.
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of employee solicitation-distribution rights remained singularly unsettled and
controversial. 3 5 The instant Court resolved that controversy, holding that employee solicitation-distribution rights under section 7 may not be waived by a
bargaining representative's agreement to an otherwise invalid restriction of
those rights. Finding "the sole issue" in the case to be the power of a labor
union to waive employee solicitation-distribution rights, the Court concluded
that a union has no such power. 36 The Court analogized to a previous distinction between a valid contractual waiver of the right to strike over economic
matters and an ineffective contractual waiver of the right to strike over unfair
labor practices.37 Generally, in exchange for a union's contractual relinquishment of the right to strike over economic issues, a return benefit of binding
arbitration for disputes arising under the contract has been secured from an
employer.3 There was, however, no reciprocal gain for the contractual loss of
the right to strike over unfair labor practices.3 9 Analogously, the Court
reasoned that solicitation-distribution rights are organizational,4° not economic,
and fundamental to a free selection by employees of their bargaining representative; contractual waiver of those rights, therefore, benefits the union's and
employer's self-interests, but harms the employees' interests in free organizational association.41 Attempting to counter the majority's analogy, the dissent
spoke of a quid pro quo for waiver of the employees' section 7 rights, but conceded that it could not identify the quid pro quo. 42 Hence, past practices of
the employer and the union will not constitute waiver-by-acquiescence because
there is no quid pro quo for the employees' loss of section 7 solicitation-distribution rights. For the same reasons, an explicit contractual waiver is also ineffective. The instant Court looked for a quid pro quo for the employees in

35. International Ass'n of Machinists, 171 N.L.R.B. 234, 236 (1968). See Dereshinsky, The
Solicitation and Distribution Rules of the NLRB, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 417, 445, 451-52, 454
(1971); Note, Contractual Waiver by Labor Unions of Employees' Solicitation-Distribution
Rights: Time for a Resolution, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 920 (1974); 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 796,
800 (1969); 14 VILL. L. Rev. 552, 553 (1969).
36. 94 S. Ct. 1099, 1102 (1974).
37. ld., cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281 (1956); Getreau v. Armco
Steel Corp., 241 F. Supp. 376, 379 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
38. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
39. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 281 (1956).
40. 94 S. Ct. 1099, 1102, 1104 (1974); Magnavox Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 265, 266 n.9 (1972).
To be protected against contractual waiver, solicitation and ilterature distribution rights
must be related to the statutory right of employees to organize. Attempts by employees to
solicit or distribute literature about the appearance of the union's president on television,
for example, or for or against a political candidate or issue, would not represent organizational rights, and a contractual ban against such solicitation or literature distribution would
therefore be upheld.
41. 94 S. Ct. 1099, 1102 (1974). On this point the Court affirmed the reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Prods., Inc., 403 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1968). The
Court thus rejected the reasoning of the Second Circuit in United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB,
440 F.2d 85 (1971), the Sixth Circuit in Magnavox Co. v. NLRB, 474 F.2d 1269 (1973),
Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621 (1965), G.M.C. v. NLRB, 345 F.2d 516 (1965), and
the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Gale Prods., Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 337 F.2d (1964).
42. 94 S. Ct. 1099, 1104 (1974).
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determining whether a contractual waiver of solicitation rights was valid, because those rights belong to the employees as individuals, not as members of a
labor organization or a work force. Such section 7 guarantees are employees'
fundamental rights to free organization as individuals, in contrast to their concerted statutory rights. Contractual waiver of solicitation-distribution rights by
unions is, therefore, impossible because those rights belong not to unions but
to employees as individuals.
Furthermore, solicitation and literature distribution are basic organizational rights belonging to all employees as individuals, not just to those who
oppose an incumbent union. 4 3 Noting the Board's change of posture on this
matter in the instant case, 44 the Court agreed that the partitioning of employees into two classes, according to their attitude toward an incumbent
union, is an illusory distinction aimed at salvaging the validity of the contractual waiver. 45 If those rights belong to all individual employees, then upholding the freedoms of all employees to solicit or distribute literature, for or
against any union, is the only equitable allocation of such rights among employees individually and is a fair balance of the interests of the employees
against the interests of the employer and the competing unions. 46 Consequently, the law concerning employee solicitation-distribution rights, even
when ostensibly restricted contractually, has reverted to those same principles
that control when there is no such contract provision
The instant case exemplifies a recent trend in the Supreme Court's decisions
to stress the individual rights of employees. 48 In NLRB v. Mid-States Metal

43. Id. at 1102.
44. Id. On this point the Court affirmed the Board's reasoning in deciding the instant
case, 195 N.L.R.B. 265 (1972), the Sixth Circuit in Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d
621, 624 (1965), and the Eighth Circuit in International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 415
F.2d 113, 116 (1969). It overruled the Board's decisions in International Ass'n of Machinists,
171 N.L.R.B. 234 (1968); H. & F. Binch Co., 168 NJL.R.B. 929, 935 (1967); Mid-States Metal
Prods., Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 812 (1966); Armco Steel Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964); Gale
Prods., Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963). It also overruled the
Seventh Circuit's decision in NLRB v. Gale Prods., Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 357 F.2d
390 (1964).
45. 94 S. Ct. 1099, 1102 (1974).
46. Id.
47. "The place of work is a place uniquely appropriate for dissemination of views concerning the bargaining representative and the various options open to the employees. So long
as the distribution is by employees to employees and so long as the in-plant solicitation is
on nonworking time, banning of that solicitation might seriously dilute §7 rights." Id.
48. 94 S. Ct. 1079, 1102 (1974). See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Corp., 94 S. Ct.
1011 (1974) (where an employee is dissatisfied with a union's representation in arbitration
over the employee's discharge under the contractual grievance procedure, he retains the right
as an individual employee to bring an action against the employer under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000(3), and the doctrine of election of remedies will not
hinder him); NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 94 S. Ct. 495 (1973) (employees have the right to
exercise their organizational rights free from unfair economic inducements to support the
campaigning union and free from penalties for failing to do so); Golden State Bottling Co. v.
NLRB, 94 S. Ct. 414 (1973) (employees may seek redress for existing unfair labor practices
against either a predecessor employer or a successor employer or both where the successor

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss4/12

8

LaPeer: Labor Law: Employee's Solicitation--Distribution Rights Supersede
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

Products, Inc., 49 cited repeatedly by the instant Court, the Fifth Circuit explicitly distinguished between the statutory rights of employees as individuals
and their concerted rights as members of a labor union or a work force.50 The
Board stressed the same distinction in the instant case when it modified the
administrative law judge's recommendation in order to include all employees. 5'
It argued the same distinction in its briefs to the Supreme Court.5 2 To permit
a union to challenge successfully a waiver of rights to which it had agreed contractually is inexplicable unless those rights are not waivable by a union or an
employer because they belong to employees as individuals. Affirming the Board,
the Court spoke of "the rights of the employees" and concluded that a union
cannot contractually waive those rights. Hence, in addition to stabilizing the
law concerning employee solicitation-distribution rights under the NLRA the
instant case illustrates the Court's propensity to uphold the statutory rights of
employees as individuals whenever those rights collide with interests of labor
organizations or employers.
RUSSELL W. LA PEER

employer took over the company with notice of the existing unfair labor practices). This
emphasis contrasts sharply with the holding in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335-36,
338, 339 (1944), that where employees' individual rights conflict with their collective rights
under a contract, the collective rights prevail unless specifically otherwise provided in the
contract. The instant case clearly holds that the statutorily guaranteed individual rights of
employees to solicit or distribute literature must supersede conflicting collective rights under
a contract. The above-cited decisions indicate that this is also true for other statutorily
guaranteed individual rights of employees.
49. 403 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1968).
50. 94 S. Ct. 1099, 1101-02, 1104 (1974).
51. Magnavox Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 265 (1972).
U.S.
, 94
52. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 6-7, NLRB v. Magnavox Co.,
S. Ct. 53 (1973); Brief for Petitioner at 12-14, NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 94 S. Ct. 1099 (1974).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

9

